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In the last 20 years, a stream of research
emerged under the label of “complex
problem solving” (CPS; see e.g., the two
editions from Frensch and Funke, 1995
and Sternberg and Frensch, 1991). This
research was intended to describe the
way people deal with complex, dynamic,
and intransparent situations. One of the
promoters of this field, Dietrich Dörner
from Bamberg University, proposed to use
complex computer-simulated scenarios as
stimulus material in psychological exper-
iments (see e.g., Brehmer and Dörner,
1993). This line of research lead to subtle
insights into the way how people deal with
complexity and uncertainty (see Dörner,
1997; Osman, 2010).
Besides knowledge-rich, realistic,
intransparent, complex, dynamic scenar-
ios with many variables, a second line of
research used more simple, knowledge-
lean scenarios with a low number of
variables (“minimal complex systems,”
MCS) that have been proposed recently
in problem-solving research for the pur-
pose of educational assessment (see Greiff
et al., 2012). In both cases, the idea behind
the use of microworlds is to increase
validity of problem solving tasks by pre-
senting interactive environments that can
be explored and controlled by participants
while pursuing certain action goals.
The construction principles behind the
minimal complex systems follow certain
formalisms like linear structural equations
or finite state automata (both described in
Funke, 2001). Subjects have to first explore
such systems (they have to understand the
causal relations between input and output
variables) and then use the acquired causal
knowledge to control the given system in
order to reach given goal values.
The main argument presented here is:
both types of systems—CPS and MCS—
can only be dealt with successfully if causal
dependencies between input and output
variables are identified and used for sys-
tem control. System knowledge is neces-
sary for control and intervention. But CPS
and MCS differ in their way of how causal
dependencies are identified and how the
mental model is constructed; therefore,
they cannot be compared directly to each
other with respect to the cognitive pro-
cesses that are necessary for solving the
tasks.
The argument in more detail: In case of
the more simple MCS problems, a com-
plete causal analysis of the system under
scrutiny can be done in short time (e.g.,
in 3min). Typically, the acquired causal
knowledge is assessed via a causal diagram
that has to be drawn by the participant
(Blech and Funke, 2006). In case of the
more complex CPS systems, time is not
enough to run a complete causal analy-
sis of the given scenario because of its
complexity. Normally, causal knowledge
about the CPS system is not assessed (there
are exceptions: e.g., Wittmann and Süß,
1999). Instead, the use of heuristics and the
use of causal knowledge derived from pre-
vious everyday experience are necessary
for constructing a causal model.
So, the role of causal cognition is
different in both types of problems. In
the simpler knowledge-lean systems,
systematic causal analysis is the main
task during exploration; no reliance
upon previous knowledge (except from
strategic knowledge) is recommended. A
detailed point-by-point analysis is needed,
domain knowledge is not important at all
(instructions sometimes warn to rely on
such knowledge). In the more complex
knowledge-rich systems, a precise causal
analysis through systematically controlled
exploration is nearly impossible; instead,
reliance upon previous content knowledge
is highly important.
In the next section, I will contrast the
two approaches by describing the role of
causal analyses for a problem-solver who
has to handle either the task of carefully
analyzing systems from the MCS type or
systems from the CPS type.
MCS: PROBLEM SITUATIONS THAT
COULD BE UNDERSTOOD COMPLETELY
BY PRECISE CAUSAL ANALYSES
Problems that could be understood com-
pletely by a precise causal analysis need to
consist of a small set of input and out-
put variables. Otherwise, constraints of
working memory and of time for analy-
sis would make such a complete analysis
impossible. For problem-solving research
within educational contexts, Greiff et al.
(2012) proposed the use of MicroDYN
items according to the formalisms of lin-
ear structural equations (see Funke, 2001)
that could be analyzed within 5min testing
time. A typical MicroDYN example con-
taining all possible types of effects between
input and output variables is shown in
Figure 1.
The task for the subject is twofold: first,
to explore the system by manipulating the
input variables and observing the effects of
this manipulation on the output variables;
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FIGURE 1 | A typical MicroDYN item as an example for a more simple system with different
kinds of effects. For the selected sets of endogenous and exogenous variables any cover story is
possible (from Greiff et al., 2012, p. 192).
second, to control the output variables
with respect to given goal values by appro-
priate manipulation of the input variables.
As one can easily see, this task requires
nothing else than identifying causal struc-
tures by active experimentation and using
the identified causal structures later for
reaching goals. The task is designed so
that subjects have a chance to identify all
causal relations by proper variation of the
inputs. No wonder that the VOTAT strat-
egy (“Vary One Thing At a Time”; Tschirgi,
1980) is seen as most relevant for succeed-
ing with the task (Fischer et al., 2012).
An advantage of this type of causal
structure is its independence from con-
tent: There is a nearly arbitrary choice of
labeling input and output variables and a
nearly arbitrary choice of selection for the
type of relationship (see Figure 1: main
effects; multiple effects; multiple depen-
dencies; side effects; eigendynamic). So,
complexity of the item structure can be
changed easily to construct large sets of
items with different difficulties (as it is
needed, e.g., in large-scale assessments like
the OECD “Programme for International
Student Assessment”).
The disadvantage of this procedure is
the unclear degree of overlap between pre-
vious knowledge about the assumed rela-
tionships between the variables (on the
side of the participant who has to iden-
tify the causal structure) and the realized
relationships. So, different item difficul-
ties result not only as a consequence of
the complexity of the chosen causal struc-
ture, but also of the (unknown) degree of
“surprise” to the participant. To decrease
this potential disadvantage, item labeling
is very unspecific (“variable A,” “controller
2,” etc.), loosing connection to everyday
knowledge.
CPS: PROBLEMS THAT COULD NOT BE
UNDERSTOOD COMPLETELY BY
PRECISE CAUSAL ANALYSES
Problems that could not be understood
completely by precise causal analyses con-
sist of a larger number of variables that
cannot be analyzed completely in a given
time frame of about an hour in the lab
that is given for (short) exploration and
(longer) control of the system. As an
example take the microworld “Tailorshop”
(originally developed by Dietrich Dörner).
The round-driven scenario simulates a
small business that produces and sells
shirts. The participants lead this business
for 12 simulated months by manipulat-
ing several variables like the number of
workers, the expenses for advertising, etc.
(see Figure 2 from Danner et al., 2011,
on p. 226, for the complete set of vari-
ables; this list is normally not shown to the
participants).
The task for the subject is to increase
the company value over the course of
the simulation period. Participants have to
rely on assumed causal relations but can-
not check the details in this case. They
have to monitor the systems’ output in
a more global way than in a MCS situa-
tion. The famous VOTAT strategy that is
helpful in the previously mentioned MCS
example would not work in this situation
because there are too many variables that
could not be controlled for in short time.
This is a typical situation for many every-
day complex problems: we cannot use
VOTAT alone to find out how to increase
the quality of the relationship with our
partner; policy-maker cannot systemati-
cally change the conditions of a nations’
education system in order to find the most
efficient one.
How can we deal with such complex
situations, anyway? If one learns about
the variables of the Tailorshop, a partici-
pant might hypothesize that “workers’ sat-
isfaction” is more dependent on “salary”
than from “social costs” or that “price of
shirts” has more influence on “demand”
than “number of shops” In real life as well
as in CPS simulations, general knowledge
about the world and knowledge about the
domain in question is guiding our prob-
lem solving activities. It is important how
variables are labeled semantically: because,
for sure, the “Machine 100” produces dou-
ble the amount of shirts than “Machine
50”—the knowledge about these labels
guides decision-making much more than
any systematic identification strategy.
ON THE UNIVERSALITY OF CAUSAL
COGNITION AND ON THE CULTURAL
SPECIFICITY OF HEURISTICS
For influencing the world, the assumed
causal mechanisms (in the case of CPS,
e.g., “more salary for workers increases
their satisfaction”; in the case of MCS, e.g.,
“increasing controller 1 by a value of 2
decreases variable C by the value of 8”)
remain the same but the reliability of the
rule is lower in the case of CPS (Howmuch
does satisfaction increase if one increases
salary from 900 to 1000 units? Is it a lin-
ear function? Has this function an upper
limit? Does the relation depend on other
variables?) than in the case of MCS. The
mechanism for producing/activating this
causal knowledge is different: in the case of
MCS, it is systematic experimentation and
testing, in the case of CPS it is hope that
some unproved world knowledge might
apply to the given case.
There is some research on cultural
differences in dealing with complexity
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and uncertainty. Strohschneider and Güss
(1999) compared students from India and
Germany while working on the complex
scenario “MORO.” Subjects in this sce-
nario had to take the role of a devel-
opmental aide and to improve the living
conditions of the Moro tribe sustainably
over a period of 20 (simulated) years. In
their conclusions about the detected cul-
tural differences, Strohschneider and Güss
(1999, p. 250) state: “We thus explain
the problem-solving differences by differ-
ences in strategic (or heuristic) expertise,
and we argue that these differences in
expertise are due to a number of spe-
cific characteristics of the cultural learning
environment.”
On amore theoretical level, Medin et al.
(2014; see also Medin and Atran, 2004)
argue that cognition occurs in “cultural
ecosystems”—it would be interesting to
learn if even abstract MCS tasks would be
conceptualized differently in different cul-
tures. For CPS tasks, this happens for sure.
Strohschneider and Güss (1998, p. 713),
for example, observed differences in plan-
ning and problem-solving styles between
German and Brazilian students with the
MCS simulation “Coldstorage” that can be
interpreted as “effects of different socio-
cultural conditions, such as accountability
of the environment, value systems, and
objective planning necessities.”
All organisms that have intentions and
follow goals will, at some point in time,
face problems in reaching them. For solv-
ing these problems, the obstacles between
given and goal state need to be removed,
and this presupposes causal cognition.
Causal cognition (in the sense of under-
standing of causal relationships between
input and output variables of dynamic sys-
tems) lies at the heart of problem solv-
ing when dynamic problems require the
manipulation of exogenous variables in
order to reach certain goal values in the
endogenous variables.
When it comes to complex and
knowledge-rich problems the use of
heuristic decision rules is necessary; more
important: the role of general world
knowledge and of specific domain knowl-
edge increases strongly. Therefore, cultural
differences (Güss and Robinson, 2014) and
cultural ecosystems (Medin et al., 2014)
will become more visible when dealing
with complex problems.
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